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In 2007 Penn State basketball coach Rene Portland retired shortly after a confidential 
settlement ended a discrimination lawsuit brought by former player Jennifer Harris against 
Portland and Penn State. Because of Portland's infamous policy of not allowing lesbians on 
her team, her departure was celebrated as a victory against homophobia in sports. Yet 
although Harris's claims ofsexual orientation discrimination were validated in the media, her 
allegations of racial discrimination were ignored or dismissed as implausible. In this article, 
we examine the omission of race from the discourse surrounding this case and suggest that 
both legal and cultural factors contribute to society's tendency to ignore the intersecting 
discrimination in sport and the mUltiplicity of identity. 
Keywords: discrimination; sport; race; gender; sexual orientation 
D escribed as "the most significant thing that has happened in trying to address 
homophobia in sport to date" (Griffin, qtd. in Hohler, 2006, p. D1), Jennifer 
Harris's lawsuit against her former basketball coach, Maureen "Rene" Portland, and 
her former school, Pennsylvania State University, drew an unprecedented amount of 
focused media coverage to the issue of sexual orientation discrimination in college 
athletics. Portland's anti-lesbian policy is infamous, and anyone who follows 
women's basketball knows of her past public statements on the issue, such as "I will 
not have it in my program" (Figel, 1986; Longman, 1991). It is also well known that 
Portland engaged in negative recruiting and used her own heterosexuality and that of 
her players to win over prospective players and their parents (Griffin, 1998). In fact, 
it was a tactic Harris says Portland had used with her family as she was choosing 
between University of Virginia-"where they date girls," Portland told them-and 
Penn State-"where we date boys" (Harris v. Portland, Amended Complaint [here­
inafter "Complaint"], 2006, p. 17). 
Portland dismissed Harris from the team at the end of her sophomore season, cit­
ing poor performance and "a work ethic and attitude that was detrimental to the 
team" (Complaint, 2006, p. 29). Harris's subsequent lawsuit that alleged Portland 
discriminated against her because of her perceived lesbian sexual orientation was 
consistent with Portland's reputation for homophobia. After decades of tacit acceptance 
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on the part of the Penn State athletic department, administration, and even fans, 
Portland's "policy" was finally being challenged. When, 2 years later, the case sl"!· 
tIed out of court and Portland subsequently-and "coincidentally"-retired, the \iIi 
gation seemed to have culminated in a partial victory over homophobia in women's 
sports even though the settlement terms and all evidence gathered remain confiden­
tial. In sports columns, on the blogosphere, in fan forums, and in other media Ollt 
lets, there was near unanimous condemnation of Portland and her anti-lesbian policy 
and of Penn State for its failure to do more than mildly reprimand her. Journalists, 
scholars, and other commentators generally saw the settlement and the replacement 
of Rene Portland as head coach as a moment of sllccess in the larger struggle against 
homophobia in women's sports (e.g., Griffin, 2007). 
Yet in contrast to the vast public discourse regarding sexual orientation, there was 
silence on the issue of race, notwithstanding the fact Harris, who is Black, made 
formal claims of race discrimination in her lawsuit. McDonald and Birrell (1999) 
critiqued the tendency in and outside of academe to ignore the complexity of inter­
sectional identity and to "frame narratives in terms that privilege one power rela­
tionship ... while ignoring others or overlooking the intersection of several axes or 
power" (p. 284). Harris's claims of discrimination based on sexual orientation were 
pondered, discussed, and often validated in the media, whereas the allegations of 
racial discrimination were largely ignored or summarily dismissed as implausible. 
[n light of this omission, we view Harris v. Portland as a unique opportunity to 
examine intersecting discrimination in the context of sport and contribute to the 
clTurt \0 pay greater attention to the multiplicity of identity and the need for prac­
tices and methodologies that renect this lived experience (Birrell & McDonald, 
2000; Carrington, 1998; McDonald & Birrell, 1999). Our analysis of Harris 1'. 
Pore/and attempts to respond to these calls for a deeper understanding of intersec­
tional identity in sport by drawing on theories and methods of intersectionality in the 
fields of critical legal studies, Black feminist theory, and women's and gender stud­
ies. Through these lenses, we examine the public documents in this case, namely, 
Harris's complaint, media accounts of Harris generally and her litigation with 
Portland, media coverage (Internet, print, and television) of Portland's history of dis­
crimination, and the reactions to the case on blogs and fan forums. We look specifi­
cally for how these sources address, both separately and together, issues of sex and 
gender, sexual orientation, and race. 
We have chosen in this article to focus on the media's erasure of Jennifer Harris's 
claims of racial discrimination and its corresponding erasure of her racial identity, 
which we attribute to a general failure to comprehend intersectional discrimination. To 
this end, we begin by offering a brief background of the case, including the most obvi­
ous claims of racism Harris levied against Portland. We then engage in an intersec­
tional analysis that illustrates how Portland's insistence on a model of normative 
femininity or a female apologetic became a racist standard. In the following section we 
discuss possible reasons why the media failed to provide as much-or any-attention 
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10 issues of race and racism in this case, in part by examining other recent events in 
women's basketball, including Sheryl Swoopes's coming out in 2005, Latasha 
Byears's 2004 lawsuit against the L.A. Sparks, and Don Imus's remarks about the 
KUlgers basketball team in 2007. Finally, we explore the ways in which the legal 
system, the venue in which Harris sought to challenge Portland's conduct, similarly 
operates to disaggregate intersecting discrimination and reduce it to single axes. In 
light of these limitations, it is perhaps not surprising that Harris's "success" in this 
,'lise probably did not come as the result of a direct application of antidiscrimination 
law. but from a tactical settlement that we believe unseated Portland from her long­
held position of power, claiming a real and symbolic victory over antigay discrimi­
lIation. In sum, we hope that by providing a fuller understanding of the case and its 
outcome, we can contribute to a greater understanding of the ways in which both cul­
luml and legal structures operate to erase the relevance of race in the context of 
women's sport. 
Evidence gathered in this case, including party depositions, remains subject to a 
nlllfidentiality order and the terms of the closed settlement prohibit the parties from 
'peaking publicly about the case. As a result, we do not know if Harris's attorneys 
l'lIuld have introduced trial evidence that would have conclusively demonstrated the 
intersectional nature of the discrimination Harris faced. In describing and under­
standing what happened between Harris and Portland, we are limited to Harris's ver­
SHIn of the events set forth in her complaint, Portland's general denials, and a few 
public statements by both parties. Despite these limited resources, we believe it is 
valuable to proceed with an analysis of this case, as it presents a mre opportunity to 
('xamine intersecting discrimination in the context of women's sport. . 
Harris v. Portland: Where Is the Racism? 
The legal case of Jennifer Harris versus Rene Portland and Penn State began offi­
l:ially in the fall of 2005, when Harris's attorneys at the National Center for Lesbian 
Rights (NCLR) sued Rene Portland, athletic director Tim Curley, and Penn State in 
federal district court in Pennsylvania.! In March of that year, after Liberty University 
upset Penn State in the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) tourna­
ment, Rene Portland dismissed Harris from the team, ostensibly for poor athletic 
performance, lack of commitment to the team, and a disrespectful attitude. But 
Harris's success as a member of the Penn State basketball team cast doubt on 
Portland's explanation that her decision to dismiss Harris was related to perfor­
mance. As a sophomore guard, she had started in 22 of 30 games that season and was 
among the team's top scorers. In fact, of the players eligible to return the following 
season, Harris had the best statistics for points scored, three-point shots, free throws, 
assists, and steals (Complaint, 2006). In her complaint, Harris and her lawyers 
offered an alternative explanation: Coach Portland discriminated against Harris on 
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the basis of her race, sex, and sexual orientation. Harris alleged that Portland relied 
on negative recruiting related to sexual orientation, that she continuously questioned 
players about their and each others' sexual orientations, and that she forced off the 
team anyone she concluded was a lesbian. Media coverage of the story corroborated 
Harris's descriptions of these practices; in interviews, former players noted that there 
was little trust within the team because of Portland's constant vigilance in keeping 
lesbians off of the team (Fulton, 2006; Lieber, 2006b; Masse & Stewart, 1998). 
The complaint further alleged that Portland accused Harris of dating a teammate, 
another Black player, during Harris's first-year season. She later concluded that the 
teammate was gay, forbade the team from associating with her, and ultimately 
kicked her off the team. The following season, Portland again accused Harris of hav­
ing a lesbian relationship, this time with another Black teammate. Portland tried to 
catch Harris with this other player and asked their teammates to watch and report on 
Harris. According to Harris, Portland told the team that she would "do whatever it 
took to prove that Jennifer was gay" (Complaint, 2006, p. 22). 
Portland instructed players to wear their hair in "feminine" styles, to wear 
jewelry and make-up, and to acquire tans (p. 17). In particular, she told Harris to 
dress in a more feminine style and to stop wearing her hair in cornrows. When Harris 
resisted, Portland berated her. On one occasion, she suggested that Harris should 
"break a leg" and "put me out of my misery"; on another, she stated that Harris is 
the reason "why they don't let coaches carry guns" (p. 22). She demoted Harris from 
her position as a starting player and pressured her to take a leave of absence from the 
team. eventually dismissing her after Penn State's early exit from the 2005 NCAA 
tournament. 
Harris's complaint also describes a pattern of racism in Portland's decision to ter­
minate or harass players. In general, Portland recruited a majority of White play­
ers-60% of the players recruited from 1997 to 2005 were White-yet over that 
same time period, African American players constituted a majority (60%) of the 
players who were terminated or quit. Harris also points out that Portland terminated 
all of the African American players who were eligible to return for the 2005-2006 
season-Harris, Amber Bland, and Lisa Etienne-and retained all three ofthe White 
players who were eligible to return (Complaint, 2006). 
These statistics constitute indirect evidence of racism in Harris's case, which can 
be rebutted legally by evidence that Portland was motivated to demote or terminate 
Hanis for legitimate reasons, such as the performance or behavior problems Portland 
cited to the press. However, the complaint also alleges direct evidence of Portland's 
racism and its effect on Harris, namely, that Portland's decision to demote and then 
terminate Harris was the consequence of "disrespecting" Portland "by not changing 
her image to be more feminine and to stop wearing cornrows" (p. 23). This evidence 
was largely misunderstood or absent from the public discourse about the case, which 
seemed to reduce the HarrislPortland narrative to the single theme of "homophobia 
in sport." 
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By interrogating the standards of appearance and behavior that Portland required 
of her players and revealing them as norms for White, heterosexual femininity, we 
can better understand the racist overlay in Portland's harassment, demotion, and ter­
mination of Jennifer Harris. Portland's mandate that her players appear and behave 
in a feminine and nonlesbian manner is a clear example of apologetic behavior, a 
concept well-documented in the literature on women and sport. It is consistent with 
and draws from the practices of women physical educators in the first half of the 
20th century to ensure the viability of their programs (Felshin, 1974; Festle, 1996). 
As Felshin (1974) explained, female athletes' apologetic behavior is a response to 
social pressure to reconcile the dissonance created by the participation of women in 
sport, an activity culturally associated with masculinity. Society'S tendency to trivi­
alize, pathologize, and otherwise disapprove of their participation in sport created 
incentives for women to distinguish their sports from men's. This "apologetic" 
trades on appearance (emphasizing normative feminine attributes like hair, makeup, 
and dress), values (prioritizing socially accepted roles for women, such as that of 
r girlfriend, wife, and mother, over participation in sport and one's competitive drive), 
and sexual normalcy (displaying convincing indicia of heterosexuality). 
Festle (1996) made clear that apologetic behavior did not retire with the physical 
educators of the early 20th century. Even into the 21st century, examples of apolo­
getic behavior from athletes and coaches persist. For instance, there is the continued 
practice of denoting (and demoting) women's teams by the use of the term Lady, as 
in the Lady Vols of Tennessee-a name Pat Summitt, the most successful women's 
basketball coach in history, wholeheartedly supports. And though the days of beauty 
pageants before competitions (Cahn, 1994; Festle, 1996) are gone, female athletes 
are still sexualized in sport magazines and in men's magazines like GQ, FHM, and 
Maxim-on television (when they receive coverage) and even in colleges' own 
media guides (Buysse, 2006). 
Portland's position on lesbians and normative femininity exhibited attributes of 
apologetic behavior as defined by Felshin and Festle. As we have explained, she 
dcarly emphasized the importance of sexual normalcy with her players, recruits, 
and their parents (Complaint, 2006; Figel, 1986; Kaufman, 1993; Lipsyte, 1991; 
Longman, 1991; Solomon, 1991). It is evident that Portland's now infamous policy 
of "no drinking, no drugs, no lesbians" was far more invasive than a "don't ask, don't 
Icll"-style code of conduct because she actively interrogated her players about their 
personal lives and encouraged them to come forward with information about each 
others' homosexual practices. In addition, Portland employed what amounts to a 
drcss code, requiring her players to "wear their hair in 'feminine' styles, wear jew­
dry, make-up, and acquire tans" (Complaint, 2006, p. 17). These requirements can­
nol possibly be read as innocuous remnants of an earlier era when a term like 
·'llIuscle moll" was a popular epithet. They reflect the continued fear of the mas­
nlfinization of women, especially the fear of homosexuality or at least the associa­
tion of homosexuality and female athletes. Given Portland's insistence that the 
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players' personal appearances convey a traditional femininity, it is likely no coinci­
dence that Penn State is the only Division I institution outside the south that retains 
the "Lady" prefix in the nickname for their women's teams. 
Portland also conveyed commitment to social roles as wife and mother. Her biog­
raphy on the Penn State athletic department Web site boasted the basketball program's 
"family atmosphere." It also mentioned Portland's husband and children and noted that 
when Portland's daughter Christine played for Penn State in the 1990s, it was the 
second-ever mother-daughter, coach-player relationship in Division I basketball. And 
though Festle (1996) noted that by the 1990s women in sports no longer needed to 
eschew the importance of winning or the desire for an athletic career to engage in 
effective apologetic behavior, Portland's decision to dismiss Harris, her best returning 
player, seems to prioritize apologetic behavior over winning (a priority that is also 
likely reflected in her decision to forgo recruiting lesbian players). 
Having contextualized Portland's position on lesbians, feminine appearance, and 
feminine values within the framework of apologetic behavior, we now turn to a 
deeper examination of the standards of normative femininity Portland imposed. 
Normative femininity, simply put, is a "white feminine ideal" (Greene, 2000, p. 243). 
Thus, it is possible to understand her instructions to Harris "to be more feminine and 
stop wearing [baggy clothes and] cornrows" in one of two ways: Portland saw 
Harris's clothes and hair as masculine, or Portland saw Harris's clothes and hair as 
Black. As we address each in turn, we are not suggesting that they are necessarily 
alternatives. Portland might have held either view or both simultaneously. Regardless, 
these explanations reveal Portland's simultaneous construction and normative 
position on Harris's race, gender, and sexuality. 
First, we will consider the possibility that Portland read Harris's cornrows and 
baggy clothes as masculine and objected to them on those grounds. Under this read­
ing, "Be more feminine and stop wearing cornrows" is redundant. "Stop wearing 
cornrows" is an example of how Portland thought Harris should "be more feminine." 
Such an interpretation fits squarely with Portland's adherence to the female apolo­
getic at the root of her anxiety about the masculinization of female athletes. 
Harris's hair and dress appear to have been influenced by the dominant image of 
men's basketball culture, and they were thus read by Portland as gender transgres­
sive. This view is supported by the fact that, according to Harris, Portland told her 
in a December 2004 meeting that she should "wear her hair down or at least in more 
'feminine' braids" (Complaint, 2006, p. 21). In other words, Portland was distin­
guishing between braids that are masculine and braids that are consistent with 
images of Black femininity. It was masculine cornrows, those popularized by NBA 
players like Allen Iverson and Carmello Anthony, which drew Portland's objection 
for their inconsistency with the female apologetic she deemed necessary to keep the 
women's game distinguishable from the men's. 
Even if Portland's hostility to Harris's cornrows was primarily about gender con­
formity rather than race, the effect of her demands on Harris required that she cover 
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11Npects of her racial identity. Harris's claim that she responded to Portland's "sug­
gl'stions" that she wear "tighter clothes" and her hair down by saying, "I'm not 
IIshamed of who I am" (Blatt & Harris, 2006, p. 97) suggests that she was perform­
Ing a strongly held identity. We do not know the extent to which she was performing 
" racial identity and gender identity (whether butchness or female masculinity 
Illaiberstam, 1998] and/or a version of heterosexual femininity measured by non­
white standards [discussed infra]). Harris's claim that Portland discriminated against 
her "for dressing and wearing her hair in ways that reflect [her] African American 
identity" (Complaint, 2006, p. 64) helps confirm, however, that her style reflects, 
rxclusively or not, an identification with Black basketball culture, which has been 
Incorporating the style of hip-hop culture ever since Chris Webber and other 
Michigan players began wearing baggy shorts in the early 1990s (Boyd, 2004). Boyd 
observes that "hip hop and [men's] hoops are blended into one large whole .... So 
lT1any players have cornrows and tattoos now that this is no longer even news" (n.p.). 
This style is not confined to male athletes, but has been incorporated into the style and 
dress of other young, female athletes of color, as Pascoe's (2007) discussion of the 
"Basketball Girls" attests. We can find examples of both men and women performing 
Blackness in ways similar to Harris. NBA players like Iverson and Anthony wear 
!'ornrows-but so do many women. Hip-hop artists Queen Latifah, Da Brat, and 
Missy Eliot have sported basketball jerseys and sneakers. The effect of Portland's pro­
hibition of cornrows and baggy clothes could have seemed, to Harris, a requirement 
1101 only that she cover her gender identity, but also that she cover her Blackness. 
Of course, we can also read Portland's injunction against cornrows and baggy 
,Iothes as a direct requirement that she cover race, which incidentally required her 
10 cover her gender identity as welL Under this reading, "Be more feminine and stop 
wearing cornrows" and baggy clothes is conjunctive rather than redundant. "Be 
more feminine" refers to the other ways in which Harris was transgressing gender 
norms (not dressing like a [White J girl, ostensibly sleeping with women). "Stop 
wearing cornrows" and baggy clothes simply means "Be less Black." 
As critical race feminists explain, the construction of Black femininity in the 
United States is not necessarily in contrast to, but is different from, that of White 
kmininity. Slavery's exploitation and commodification of Black women created, 
perpetuated, and benefited from stereotypes about Black women's perceived ani­
malistic physicality and exotic hypersexuality (Collins, 2004; Fordham, 1993). Such 
stereotypes not only operated as justification for slaveholders' consigning female 
slaves to hard labor and nonconsensual sex but were also deployed to create and sus­
tain the contrasting myth of White feminine delicacy, physical ineptitude, and sex­
ual purity, which simultaneously served as a tool of the patriarchy. 
Modern "caricatures" of Black women also operate to complicate the intersection 
of race, gender, and sexual orientation (Ammons, 1995, p. 1050). For example, 
stereotypes of the domineering "Sapphire" and the strong, independent matriarch 
have been deployed to pathologize Black, female-headed households and scapegoat 
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them for the perceived greater economic problems experienced by Blacks and Black 
men in particular (Ammons, 1995; Austin, 1989; Oglesby, 1981; Wallace, 1979). 
The belief that Black women caused Black men to lack proper masculine traits, 
thereby contributing to Black poverty, created backlash against strong, independent 
Black women, including lesbians (Collins, 2000; Shockley, 1983). Together the 
stereotypes put Black women in a double bind-or "catch 22" (e.g., Ramachandran, 
2005)-giving them little space to construct their own identity or display any ver­
sion of femininity without being read as deviant: hardworking mule (who neglects 
her own children) or lazy welfare queen (stay-at-home mother), "ho" (sexually avail­
able) or emasculating Sapphire (sexually autonomous) . 
Finding the space to exist within and among the stereotypes can be a difficult 
challenge for any Black woman, but perhaps especially athletes. Black female ath­
letes are subject to the same sexualizing and dehumanizing comparisons to animals 
that justified slavery (Oglesby, 1981; Vertinsky & Captain, 1998). In recent years we 
see this most vividly in the coverage of professional tennis players and sisters Venus 
and Serena Williams (Douglas, 2002; Schultz, 2005), suggesting that attributes of 
athleticism such as muscular physique and aggressive style of play render Black ath­
letes susceptible to this comparison. Collins (2004) suggested that as a result of this 
"different interpretive context" (p. 135), Black female athletes have to work harder 
to avoid being stigmatized as lesbians by the dominant culture. Thus, although 
homophobia is deployed against female athletes of all races, the standards of White 
femininity exert different pressures on Black women to portray themselves as het­
erosexual and family-oriented, as the marketing strategies of the Women's National 
Basketball Association (WNBA) attest (Collins, 2004). This suggests that Black 
female athletes may experience particularized versions of the double bind that con­
strains Black femininity. For example, the media's focus on an athlete's husband and 
children may affirm her heterosexuality but undermine her effort to be taken seri­
ously as an athlete. And in light ofthe Jezebel stereotype discussed above, a coach's 
demand that players overcompensate for the lesbian stigma by displaying a hetero­
sexy image can be perilous for a Black athlete who wants to avoid reinforcing the 
stereotype that Black women are lascivious "hos." 
Portland's demand that her players engage in apologetic behavior as a condition 
for remaining on the team would have created a difficult if not impossible negotia­
tion for her Black players to undertake. For one, the stereotypes about Black femi­
ninity we have discussed underscore White femininity as the universal norm and the 
source of standards of beauty and appearance. Against these norms, "African 
American women are viewed as less feminine and less physically attractive than 
White women" (Greene, 2000, p. 244). Patricia Hill Collins (2000) noted that Black 
women cannot live up to the standards of femininity-such as straight hair-which 
are set by society and based on White womanhood. Moreover, components of Black 
femininity that are inconsistent with the White feminine ideal are potentially read by 
the dominant culture as masculine or lesbian (Omusupe, 1991). 
Thus, Portland's requirement that 
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Thus, Portland's requirement that Harris forgo her braids and baggy clothes can 
be read as an impossible demand that she adhere to White standards of feminine 
beauty as a condition for remaining on the team. Harris says that some of her behav­
ior that offended Portland included suggesting to Portland that "as strong Black 
women [she] and her mother acted as positive role models for [a] teammate" whom 
Portland had accused Harris of sleeping with (Complaint, 2006, p. 21). This state­
ment-which draws a distinction between "strong Black women" on one hand and 
an athlete perceived by Portland to be gay on the other-suggests that Harris and 
Portland recognized gender nonconformity in very different ways. Though Harris's 
White teammates may have also experienced Portland's standards as a demand to 
cover gender nonconforming behavior and appearance, there was no inherent racial 
judgment attached to this requirement, as there was when the standards were applied 
to Black women. Moreover, the standards imposed by Portland illustrate her utter 
lack of awareness of issues of race. That she could stand in a room of players, almost 
half of whom were Black, and urge them to tan would be nearly comic if it did not 
reflect the ingrained racism in society and the general failure to see the effect of 
racial stereotypes on gender constructions and vice versa. 
Not only did race likely factor into the standards of behavior and dress code 
POltland required of her players, it probably also mediated Portland's interpretation 
or Harris's resistance to her demands. Morris (2007) suggested that the long-stand­
ing marginalization of Black women from the dominant construct of femininity has 
"contributed to a standpoint from which [they] could reject the dominant ideology 
of gender inequality" (p. 511). As Omusupe reinforces, many Black women have 
internalized a nonwhite definition of femininity and thus do not consider their 
behavior transgressive or resistant. For example, in Morris's (2007) study, Black 
middle-school girls were "perplexed" at their teacher's suggestion that being out­
spoken and assertive is not appropriate ladylike behavior. Moreover, they felt it 
unnecessary to participate in the (apologetic) strategies of their White classmates: 
They spoke up in class, they did not downplay their academic success, and they did 
flot let their male classmates get away with hitting or "messing with" them (p. 498). 
As a result, their teachers interpreted them as loud, full of attitude, and a threat to 
their authority, and they disproportionately disciplined Black girls for behavior and 
appearance infractions (Evans, 1988; Fordham, 1993; Morris, 2007). 
A similar ethic in Harris would have set her on a collision course with Rene 
Portland. And collide they did when Harris denied Portland's accusations of les­
hianism and asserted that "she was comfortable with who she was and did not want 
10 change her image" (Complaint, 2006, p. 21). Like the teachers in Morris's study, 
Portland interpreted this attitude as a threat to her authority, which could explain 
why Portland "continually singled [Harris] out in practice for humiliation, berating 
lind demeaning her in front of her teammates" before demoting her from a starting 
position and ultimately kicking her off the team (p. 22). 
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In sum, although we cannot know why Harris denied Portland's accusations and 
resisted her demands, we can identify her double bind. Because she was not acting 
feminine enough for White society, she was deemed masculine and thus a lesbian. 
In high school, there was no Rene Portland yet, but the dominant culture constantly 
reminded her of her deviance. She was taunted in opponents' gyms by fans shouting 
"Mister Harris" instead of the usual jeers of "miss the ball" (Lieber, 2006a). Playing 
for Portland's ostensibly, emphatically heterosexual team may have seemed like an 
opportunity for reprieve from this harassment. Yet Portland's apologetic demands, 
the quid pro quo for this cover, proved impossible to satisfy. For Harris, there was 
no appearance, no behavior available to her as a Black woman that was unmarked in 
contrast to the White femininity that remains exnominated. As Caldwell (1991) has 
said, Black "women . . . live by the circumscriptions of competing beliefs about 
white and black womanhood and in the interstices of racism and sexism" (p. 369-370). 
From the constrictions of this interstitial space, Harris resisted Portland's apologetic 
and used the legal system to challenge the retaliation she experienced as a result. 
Jennifer Harris, Race, and the Media 
In general, the press reported on Harris v. Portland as a case about sexual orien­
tation discrimination (e.g., Anderson, 2005; Associated Press, 2006). In this regard, 
the coverage represents a praiseworthy departure from the historic silence on the 
taboo issue of homophobia in sport (though we do not think this case required sports 
or mainstream media to stray far from its comfort zone because they could always 
accurately and appropriately point out to their readers that the victim in this case was 
merely perceived to be gay). The framing of the case reduced it to the single axis of 
sexual orientation, to the exclusion of the intersecting axes of race and gender. 
A failure to acknowledge intersectional discrimination created the space in which 
Rene Portland was allowed to operate without negative consequences. The media, as 
not just a reflection of culture, but a creator of it, participated in the construction of 
this relatively safe space. We examine the rhetorics of colorblindness and racial har­
mony, the discourse and public perceptions of race (in and outside of sport), to 
understand how these manifested in the Harris case as well as three other recent 
events that presented opportunities to the media to address issues of intersectional­
ity in the context women's basketball. 
One of the clearest explanations of the perceived absence of race in the media is 
Penn State's own internal investigation of Jennifer Harris's claims. After Harris filed 
suit, but before the expected trial date and eventual settlement, Penn State cited and 
reprimanded Portland for creating a "hostile, intimidating, and offensive environ­
ment" because of Harris's perceived sexual orientation, but determined that there 
was insufficient evidence to find Portland culpable of race discrimination. When race 
was mentioned at all in the media, it frequently amounted to a one-line statement 
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about the university's lack of findings on the racial discrimination claim. This had 
Ihe effect of extinguishing further discussion of the racial and intersectional dis­
l'I'imination and also, we believe, implied that Harris's claims of racial discrimina­
I ion were unfounded and would have similarly been rejected by the court. Because 
I.he investigation report is not public, we cannot know what evidence the internal 
,lIvcstigators considered or what standards they used. Thus, we cannot rely on Penn 
Stale's internal investigation to judge the extent to which race contributed to 
Portland's conduct. 
There is not enough written evidence to identify a particular reason why it was so 
easy for the media and public alike to believe that Harris could not have been the 
victim of racial discrimination. Even fan message boards, which are usually quite 
candid in their assessment of a team's or university's goings-on, remained silent or 
dismissive on the issue of race (pointing out, for example, that Portland recruits 
Black players). The silence, however, is consistent with White cultural attitudes 
toward race and race and sport. In a so-called post-Civil Rights era, popular rhetoric 
values the concept of a color-blind society and eschews any mention of the word 
""<tce." Indeed, it perpetuates the idea that just talking about race is racist. Sport, like 
l'vcry other institution, fosters this rhetoric. Wrote Schultz (2005): "The purported 
,'olor blindness of U.S. sport and the media often downplays or obscures direct dis­
clissions of 'race'" (p, 339). 
Except, that is, when sport is being used as a model of successful race relations 
(Hartmann, 2007). For example, then-Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich, extolling 
(ht~ racial progress that sport exemplifies by reference to the Chicago Bulls, said, 
Obsessing on race will not allow us to move beyond race. Perspiration and teamwork 
will dissolve racism faster than therapy and dialogue, This is the example for society to 
follow-a group of individuals so focused on a common goal of winning that they don't 
have time to worry about what color the other guy is. (qtd. in Hobennan, 1998, p. B06) 
These two rhetorics, color blindness and racial harmony, illustrate not contradic­
tory ways of dealing with race but rather complementary ones (Hoberman, 1998, 
2002; Springwood, 2006). Springwood (2006) wrote, "Ironically, American sport is 
lIll arena, in the popular imagination, which simultaneously celebrates itself as a 
racial utopia while erasing race and racism" (p. 365), A public discussion of 
Portland's or Penn State's racism begins to dissolve the myths around race in 
American culture by acknowledging a potential problem with race relations in sport. 
For example, such a discussion would shatter the belief that close proximity to a 
Black person diminishes the racist capacity of a White person. 
Why would it be so difficult to believe that a White woman could be homopho­
hie-something the media had no problem reporting-but not racist? In her book on 
White women who "think[] through race," Ruth Frankenberg (1993) argued that 
"essentialist racism" characterized by hatred on the basis of biological racial difference 
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has diminished and given way to color evasiveness and color blindness that is not 
characterized by most in the dominant culture as racist. She and other critical race 
theorists have delineated various forms of racism that reflect sociohistorical changes 
in American culture (e.g., Glenn, 2(02). Part of the goal of this work is to challenge 
the contention that racism no longer exists because practices such as slavery, lynching, 
and formally segregated schools have been abolished. What Frankenberg (1993) has 
called color evasiveness does not absolve White women of their "complicity with 
structural and institutional dimensions of inequality" (p. 143). Claims that Portland 
is racist are easily dismissed by a culture that pretends not to see color and refuses 
to discuss it. Arguments that Portland could not be racist because she recruits Black 
women to her team resemble those that emerged from Frankenberg's (1993) inter­
views, in which White women claimed that their many interactions with women of 
color had taught them to see only humans, not race. A perceived lack of discrimina­
tory intent protects White women from accusations of racism. "Good women" can­
not be "real racists." (p. 147). And certainly Portland can be seen as a good woman 
by those who want to, including those who do not see homophobia as a problem. A 
member of the championship, underdog Immaculata basketball team in the 1970s, 
she has earned the moniker "women's sports pioneer." She has received awards for 
her work in women's sports and in 2005 was named "Person of the Year" by the 
Renaissance Fund for her monetary support of scholarships for student athletes 
(Hohler, 2006). The joint press release announcing the settlement in Harris v. 
Portland reinforced this image, calling her "a tireless advocate and major spokesper­
son for equality in women's sports under Title IX" (Harris v. Portland, Joint Public 
Statement, 2007). 
We suggest, though, that the media's inability to legitimate the multiple jeopar­
dies Harris faced goes beyond the conclusions of Penn State's internal investigation 
and Portland's character and speaks more broadly to Crenshaw's (1991) critique of 
a liberal society in which "race, gender, and other identity categories" are "vestiges 
of bias or domination" that should be "empt[ied] of any social significance." 
(p. 1242). Because sport, or at least basketball, has been deemed free from racism 
based on the prevalence of Black players, sportswriters were free to focus on sexual 
orientation discrimination. The resulting discourse effectively "emptied" not only 
Harris's race of its "social significance," but also her claims of racism. 
Of course, we do not suggest that the media is solely responsible for the cultural 
inability to comprehend intersectional identity (in fact, we examine the legal system's 
contributions to this problem in the following section). Yet we believe it is worth 
contextualizing the public discourse about Jennifer Harris with other examples in 
which the intersectional identities of female basketball players have been reduced to 
a single category. 
The first example is Sheryl Swoopes, who told ESPN the Magazine in October 
2005 that she was a lesbian with a long-time partner (Granderson, 2005). The 
announcement created a flurry of media commentary that addressed a variety of 
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themes: Swoopes's belief that she was not born a lesbian, how much more difficult 
ace 
not 
it is for a male athlete to come out, Swoopes as role model, and speculations on 
ges whether her announcement would dismantle homophobia in sports. The columns 
1ge and articles always foregrounded her sexuality and rarely mentioned her race. There 
ng, were a few exceptions. Mechelle Voepel (2005), writing for the Kansas City Star, 
suggested that Swoopes's coming out broke a few stereotypes (presumably about 
'ith 
~as 
lesbians), including the fact that she is African American. She also noted that there 
md are few publicly gay Black celebrities. Other articles mentioned this fact briefly as 
ses well-in part because Swoopes raised the issue in her coming out story by claiming 
lck that she did not know of any high-profile, openly gay African Americans because 
.er- "it's not accepted in the black community" (qtd. in Granderson, 2005). But Voepel 
of was unable to see how Swoopes's race figures into the stereotypes she was ostensi­
lla­ hly breaking by being "strikingly attractive" and "glamorous" (Voepel, 2005). It is 
an­ not our goal here to deconstruct Sheryl Swoopes or deconstruct her performance of 
lan race and gender and sexuality; rather we point out that any commentary by Voepel, 
.A or others, on how what is seen as attractive in Swoopes reflects a construction of nor­
Os, mative White femininity. Even in his blog post on Swoopes's coming out, public 
for Intellectual Keith Boykin (2005), who could arguably be one of those few other gay 
the Black celebrities, used race only as a point of comparison to homosexuality. 
tes Craig Washington (2005), also a Black gay man, was one of the few writers to 
v. pay more explicit attention to Swoopes's race and the historical oppression of Black 
er­ pl'OpJe, including Black athletes. Writing for the Southern Voice, Washington noted 
>lic that Swoopes's openness will help young Black lesbians and that she deserves her 
~tatus as role model for Black girls even more after coming out. The only commen­
ar­ Iilry we found that considered race and sexuality as inextricable was on a blog, 
on hlackfeminism.org, where Tiffany Brown (2005) wrote: 
of 
~es In order to be a woman athlete, you had to be comfortable breaking, or be exempt from, 
traditional (racialized) gender roles. Lesbians inherently fit the bill. Black women also e." 
sm did because the belief that women were "delicate, fragile flowers" was not a privilege 




Similarly, race was conspicuously absent from the media's coverage of another 
"tory involving a Black, lesbian basketball player, Latasha Byears, who in 2003 was ral 
,"arged with raping a former L.A. Sparks teanunate at a team party. Byears denied n's 
the l'harges and, after a 2-year investigation, the Los Angeles police dropped the case rth 
ttll lack of evidence. In a wrongful termination lawsuit (which eventually settled), in 
ihears alleged that her dismissal from the L.A. Sparks during this time was dis­to 
! n Illinatory on the basis of her gender and sexual orientation, pointing out that the 
"pmb' brother organization, the Lakers, stood behind and continued to employ ler "I )hl.' Bryant when he was facing similar charges (Quinn, Red, & 0'Keeffe, 2005). he 
lIycars's story resembles Harris's in a number of ways. Both wore cornrows and of 
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were perceived as masculine in appearance and bchaviOl'. both were dismissed from 
their respective teams due to allegations of behavior Ihat could never be proven, both 
had been told by superiors in their respective teams to cover behavior deemed 
deviant (Bondy, 2005), and both challenged the discrimination they said they faced 
because of their (perceived, in Harris's case) sexual orientation. 
Moreover, the media's coverage of Byears's lawsuit is similar to that of Harris's 
in its omission of any discussion of race. The media explicitly referenced Byears's 
masculine appearance and behavior and self-acknowledged lesbian sexual orienta­
tion (Quinn et aI., 2005). Moreover, descriptions of Byears contained implicit racial 
references, such as the many comparisons to NBA "thugs" like Dennis Rodman and 
Allen Iverson, and the numerous recountings of her self-declared childhood desire 
to be a pimp when she grew up (Jackson, 2005; Kobrin & Levin, 2005; McGraw, 
2005; Quinn et aI., 2005; Terry, 2006). But the articles never suggested that racial 
stereotypes about sexually aggressive Black men or sexually promiscuous Black 
women could have played any role in the rape charges brought against her or in her 
subsequent dismissal from the team and exile from the WNBA. Again, the myth of 
a color blind and race-evasive society obscured the intersecting role of race in the 
alleged discrimination experienced by an openly gay player commonly perceived as 
a "thug" and a "pimp." 
(Perceived) deviancy among female Black basketball players, like Byears and 
Harris. became the center of attention in April 2007 when radio personality Don 
linUS descrihed the Rutgers women's basketball team, who had just lost the NCAA 
championship to Tennessee. as "nappy-headed hos." Program guest Sid Rosenburg2 
responded to Imus's comment by suggesting that the Rutgers team bore a strong 
resemblance to the NBA's Toronto Raptors.3 Rosenburg's comment, alongside 
Imus's "nappy-headed ho" remark, illustrates the complex double bind created when 
race, gender, and sexuality intersect in sport. Although Imus's remark perpetuated 
racist/sexist stereotypes about physical appearance and Black women's promiscuity, 
Rosenberg's paradoxically disparages them for failing to comply with a heterosexy 
feminine ideal. 
Together, Imus's and Rosenberg's comments mark the team members as deviant 
on the basis of gender, race, and sexuality. Yet the public discussion that followed 
and ultimately prompted MSNBC and CBS radio to cancel the syndicated broadcast 
of Imus's program focused largely on the racism inherent in the comment. 
(McDonagh and Pappano [2007] made a similar observation in their preface.) As one 
columnist observed, "It isn't the Don Imus 'hos' insult that has a lot of Black people 
calling for his head. It is his use of 'nappy-headed'" (Mitchell, 2007, p. 12). Though 
feminists did condemn the racialized misogyny in Imus's comments (Gandy, 2007; 
Mullins, 2007), their reaction "appeared more muted" (Brennan, 2007) than that of 
the Black religious leaders and journalists who were among the first to public ally 
criticize the remarks (Some criticized the feminists for arriving late to the conversa­
tion [e.g., Knapp, 2007], others faulted the media for framing the issue as race over 
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sex and thus marginalizing the voices of many feminists who spoke out on this issue 
IBrennan, 2007]). Characteristically, headlines reduced the controversy to one over 
Imus's "racial remark," "racist comment," or "racial slur" (Carter, 2007; Carter & 
Story, 2007; CBS/Associated Press, 2007; National Association of Black Journalists, 
2(07). This tendency, along with the media's omission of Rosenberg's comment 
l'omparing the women to the Toronto Raptors, stymied much examination of the sub­
lie homophobia it deployed (the exception is Carroll, 2007). After all, the "mannish" 
I"cmale athlete stereotype has long and effectively operated to oppress female 
athletes by casting doubt about their heterosexual orientation (Cahn, 1994; Griffin, 
11)98). 
In contrast to the narratives about Harris, Swoopes, and Byears, which were 
reduced to a single axis of sexual orientation discrimination with little or no atten­
lion paid to race and gender, the Rutgers narrative emerged as one of predominantly 
racial discrimination, with some examination of sex discrimination and very little 
attention paid to sexual orientation. Perhaps this distinction illustrates just how obvi­
"liS racism (and sexism and homophobia and most of the other "-isms") has to be to 
grab the media's attention. It also may be due to the fact that in the Rutgers story, the 
discrimination came from Don Imus, an outsider to sport, making it safe to discuss 
I ;Il'e without challenging the myth of racial harmony and colorblindness within 
'port. In this way, the Rutgers narrative joins the discourse about Swoopes, Byears, 
alld Jennifer Harris as examples demonstrating our cultural inability to fully exam­
11Il' intersecting discrimination in sport. 
Intersectionality, Law, and Discourse 
(iiven the interrelatedness of law and culture, our project would be incomplete 
W II hout an examination of the legal structures that contribute to public framing of this 
I dse. In particular, we argue that in light of the categorical nature of antidiscrimina­
lit III law, the media and other outlets of public discourse cannot help but replicate the 
Llw's tendency to perceive intersecting discrimination as severable, which contributes 
I., the omission and erasure of certain aspects of the case, namely race. 
The structure of civil rights statutes both reflects and int1uences our tendency to 
n~"jgn discrimination to discrete categories of race, sex, or sexual orientation, among 
"liters. Some statutes, like Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (pro­
Illbiting sex discrimination in federally funded schools) and Title VI of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 (prohibiting race discrimination in public accommodations) 
.I, Idress only single categories of discrimination. Other state and federal statutes, like 
Illk VII (prohibiting employment discrimination on various grounds), address mul­
tiple categories of discrimination, but do so disjunctively in a manner that forces 
plaintiffs to articulate a cause of action under one category at a time. For example, 
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the federal court in DeGraffenried v. General Motors ( 1977) expressly rejected an 
interpretation of Title VII that would have protected Black female plaintiffs from dis­
crimination based on a combination of race and sex (Caldwell, 1991; Crenshaw, 
1989). Beyond statutory law, even the federal Constitution's nondiscrimination pro­
vision-which does not reference any categories but generally requires that states 
provide citizens "equal protection of the laws" (U .S. Constitution, Amendment XIV, 
§ i)-has been consistently applied in a categorical manner, with courts differenti­
ating between various classes of discrimination (race, gender, and others) to deter­
mine the level of scrutiny to apply to laws that invoke a particular categorical 
distinction. 
As a result of the single-axis nature of discrimination law, plaintills contesting 
multiple or intersecting discrimination must rely on separate theories and often sep­
arate laws, resulting in a compartmentalization of discrimination that is often to 
plaintiffs' detriment. Harris's case is no exception, as she was forced by the categor­
ical nature of discrimination law to disaggregate the intersecting discrimination she 
experienced at Penn State into three separate theories: discrimination on the basis of 
her perceived sexual orientation, on the basis of sex, and on the basis of race. Even 
Harris's Equal Protection claim, which addressed all three components of discrimi­
nation in a single consolidated claim, was subject to the argument that Portland's 
attorneys made, that the sexual orientation aspects could be extracted from those 
IlSpects of the claim having to do with sex and race (Harris v. Portland, Brief in 
Support of Det'endant's Motion to Dismiss. 20(6). Had it been successful, this argu­
Illt'ut would have weakened Harris's Equal Protection claims because the category 
of discrimination thai was perhaps easiest to recognize in her case, sexual orienta­
tion. is also the category that receives the least protection in the hierarchy of Equal 
Protection scrutiny, The case settled before any judge had to consider the merits of 
this argument. But it is relevant here to demonstrate that even mUltiple, intersecting 
forms of discrimination presented in a unified claim may be easily perceived as 
severable and that it is in some cases advantageous for defendants to argue for such 
disaggregation. 
Turning next to Harris's stand-alone race and sex discrimination claims, it is evi­
dent that the single-axis nature of antidiscrimination law also operated to her dis­
advantage. In her complaint, Harris alleged that Portland violated Title IX's 
prohibition on sex discrimination "when she demoted, harassed, and dismissed 
[her] from the team because [she] failed to conform to gender stereotypes." Read 
narrowly, Title IX does not apply in this situation. Portland did not discriminate 
against Harris because her sex is female; rather, she discriminated against Harris 
because Harris performed her gender in ways that Portland read as masculine. But 
despite this narrow construction, courts have read Title IX and other sex discrimi­
nation statutes to protect against some forms of gender discrimination as well as sex 
discrimination. Most notably, the Supreme Court held in a 1989 decision, Price 
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Waterhouse v. Hopkins, that an employer could not discriminate against a female 
t'mployee for promotion because she was perceived as too aggressive for a woman, 
where aggressiveness, at least in men, was a qualification for advancement. 
Ilowever, this decision did not result in lower courts' uniform acceptance of sex dis­
crimination statutes' protection for gender nonconformity. Some lower courts have 
l'l:ad the Price Waterhouse decision to stand for the narrow proposition that only sex 
stereotyping that imposes a demonstrable burden on female employees is action­
lIhle. Under this rationale, they have largely upheld workplace dress codes that 
I'cLjuire conformity to gender stereotypes (Levi, 2008). Another important limitation 
of the sex stereotyping doctrine occurs when courts reject, as many do, the argu­
Incnt that same-sex attraction qualifies as gender nonconforming behavior, which 
ensures that gender nonconformity remains eligible for protection as sex discrimi­
nation while sexual orientation does not. Both of these limitations would have dis­
mlvantaged Harris because much of the discrimination she alleged was either 
motivated by Portland's self-avowed lesbian bias (her attempts to regulate whom 
Ilarris was dating or sleeping with, her accusations that Harris was dating other 
players, and her enlistment of other players and Harris's mother to catch Harris with 
unother woman and prevent her from associating with other suspected lesbians) or 
nllJld be characterized as a gender normative dress code (demoting and terminating 
Harris as punishment for "disrespecting Portland by not changing her image to be 
lIIore feminine and stop wearing cornrows"). Thus, at the intersection of sex! 
~cnder and sexual orientation, the single-axis nature of Title IX disadvantaged 
Harris. 
Not only does Title IX fail to redress discrimination at the intersection of sex and 
~cxual orientation, it also likely contributed to the public framing of Harris's case 
in a way that erased the racial nature of the discrimination at issue. Both as a fed­
t~·ral law in general, and as an antidiscrimination law in particular, Title IX is 
uniquely pervasive in the cultural discourse. In the words of two authors, Title IX 
"may be the first federal law to achieve pop status" (Levit & Verchick, 2006, p. 
1(7). It is celebrated in some circles and vilified in others, sometimes receiving 
1l10re credit, and often receiving more blame, than is warranted by the context. As 
its popularity attests, Title IX's influence on culture is more than the direct effect of 
particular, individual enforcement actions brought in its name. It has influenced and 
l'Ontinues to influence cultural perceptions of discrimination in and around its 
scope. 
Title IX is credited with increasing the number of opportunities for women to par­
ticipate in collegiate and interscholastic athletics (Carpenter & Acosta, 2(05), but 
White female athletes have been the primary beneficiaries of this progress. For 
example, the Women's Sports Foundation (2003) reported that 77% of intercollegiate 
learns added between 1981 and 1998 were in sports where Black female athletes are 
moderately or severely underrepresented. Many of the women's sports that have 
('merged in the Title IX era-like golf, tennis, ice hockey, soccer, equestrian, rowing, 
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and water polo--are more popular among or are more ea!;ily accessed by White ath­
letes (Evans, 1998; Mathewson, 1995). Consequently, .Black female athletes remain 
relegated to two sports, basketball and track (Mathewson, )995; National Collegiate 
Athletic Association, 2007; Oglesby, 1981; Olson, 19(0). Though Title IX has created 
more and better opportunities for female athletes of color to compete in basketball and 
track, racialized patterns of participation create problematic inequities for Black 
female athletes who participate in these sports, in particular, by perpetuating "the myth 
that African Americans have naturally superior speed and jumping skills" (Olson, 
1990, p. 129; see also Oglesby, 1981). The widespread belief in the inherent, univer­
sal talent and ability of Black athletes makes it easy for society to ignore and dismiss 
the intellect, creativity, and character that Black athletes bring to the game (Davis, 
1995), which in tum makes it easy to internalize racial stereotypes about intellectual 
inferiority and exclude African Americans from positions of power including coaching 
and athletic administration (Davis, 1999; Hoberman, 1997; Shropshire, 1996; Smith, 
1996). Due to its singular focus on sex discrimination, Title IX is limited in its ability 
to address intersecting discrimination, as in the case of female athletes of color. Owing 
to the popular status that Title IX enjoys, it is possible that this limitation pervades 
public discourse about discrimination in its purview. 
Harris's stand-alone race discrimination claims were also operating at a disad­
vantage created by the single-axis nature of antidiscrimination law, which fails to 
address additional, particular discrimination that is rooted in the intersection of race 
.md sex. For example, as Caldwell (1991) explained, employers may make adverse 
employment decisions against Black female employees that reflect and perpetuate 
stereotypes about Black female sexuality. She examines one case in which an unmar­
ried Black woman lost her position as a youth counselor when she became pregnant 
because her employer believed that she was no longer able to serve as a role model 
for teenagers. They may also "exclude black women from jobs that involve contact 
with the public" because of the premium they place, or assume that their customers 
place, on (White) female sexuality (p. 375). By declining to mitigate such discrimi­
natory conduct in the workplace, the law has not only failed to produce precedent 
that would have contributed to the success of Harris's race discrimination claim, but 
it also contributed to a public perception that fails to recognize or validate claims of 
intersecting discrimination such as Harris's. 
Moreover, the essentialist beliefs preventing antidiscrimination law from differ­
entiating between Black women and White women, or Black women and Black men, 
may also prevent it from differentiating among Black women. As Carbado and 
Gulati (2001) explained, 
The social meaning of being a black woman is not monolithic and static but contextual 
and dynamic. An important way in which it is shaped is by performance. In other 
words, how black women present their identity can (and often does) affect whether and 
how they are discriminated against. (p. 717) 
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They offer the hypothetical example of a Black female employee who is not pro­
moted by her employer, not on the basis of race (because the employer promotes other 
Black employees), nor gender (because the employer promotes other women), nor 
l'ven because of her status as a Black woman (because the employer promotes other 
Black women), but because of how she performs her identity as a Black woman by 
her appearance and behavior. Applying an essentialist view of race and sex, courts 
allow employers to regulate indicia of race that are socially constructed and perfor­
Illative, such as appearance and behavior-as did the court in Rogers v. American 
Airlines (1981) when it upheld an employer's policy against cornrows because it did 
not affect a "natural" hairstyle (Yoshino, 2002, p. 888). Such applications of essen­
lialist beliefs in law suggest that they are pervasive in culture as well, contributing to 
lhc public inability to perceive demands that Harris alter her hair and clothing, which 
Illay have signified Blackness, as a form of discrimination that intersects with race. 
The limits of discrimination law to address intersecting, performance-based iden­
lily would have made it difficult for Harris to press her race discrimination claims in 
l"Durt. Neither the fact that Portland dismissed all three active Black players who 
were eligible to return for the 2005-2006 season and allowing all of the returning 
White players to continue to participate on the team nor the fact that she tended to 
dismiss Black players at a relatively higher rate than White players conclusively 
establishes that Portland intentionally discriminated against Harris on the basis of 
race as required under Title VI. Had the case proceeded to trial, such evidence would 
have established at most a presumption of intentional discrimination, which Portland 
l'()uld have rebutted by demonstrating that she had other, legitimate reasons for ter­
l1linating Harris from the team. To this end, Portland would have attempted to prove 
in court what she had already stated publicly-that she terminated Harris because of 
her bad attitude. By allowing Portland to proffer this reason as an alternative to racial 
animus, the law helps obscure the possibility that Portland's perception of Harris's 
"bad attitude" was her subjective interpretation of Harris's appearance and behavior. 
Portland's decision could have instead been about attitude and race, namely her per­
lormance of her identity as a "strong" black woman who chose to "dress[] and 
wear!] her hair in ways that reflect [her] African-American identity" (Complaint, 
2006, p. 64). Thus, the tendency of antidiscrimination law to compartmentalize dis­
vrimination on the basis of sex, sexual orientation, and race, which, when coupled 
with essentialist omission of performative, constructive attributes of these cate­
gories, would have made it difficult for Harris to articulate a race discrimination case 
"gainst Portland on the basis of the facts alleged. 
I n sum, we suggest that the single-axis nature of antidiscrimination law con­
Iributes to both the framing of particular cases involving intersectional discrimina­
I ion and generally to the overall perception that sex, and increasingly sexual 
oricntation as Harris's case attests, are the operative forms of discrimination in col­
kge athletics. These limitations of law contribute to the explanation for the omission 
Ilf race from the discourse about Harris's case. 
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Conclusion 
We have identified three reasons why the claims of sexual orientation discrimination 
were privileged over those of gender and race in the media and public discourse of the 
Harris case. First, the framing reflects the cultural inability to comprehend race, gender, 
and sexuality as intersectional. Second, there was a lack of understanding about dis­
crimination based on identity versus perfonnance of identity. And third, many who saw 
the injustice in Rene Portland's homophobic behavior felt homophobia as the most 
salient issue in this case and wanted her to be punished for her years of bad behavior. 
The last was perhaps the easiest to see and comprehend, and even embrace; how­
ever, in this article, we have theorized that the discrimination Harris faced likely 
derived from a raced and gendered dynamic that was made invisible because of the 
failure to understand intersectionality and the differences between identity and per­
fonnance of identity. A disciple of the female apologetic, Portland may have 
attempted to censor Harris's style because she associated it with masculinity. Such a 
reading, however, ignores the increasingly gender-nonspecific convergence of hip­
hop and basketball. Moreover, Harris could not comply with the femininity standard 
Portland imposed on the team because this standard is modeled on White feminin­
ity. Any effort she could have made to emphasize her heterosexuality, an important 
component of Portland's femininity ideal, would have likely made her vulnerable to 
racial stereotypes about promiscuity. We also suggest that race may have modulated 
Portland's perception of Harris's insubordination and motivated her retaliatory deci­
sion to terminate her from the team. 
Despite the role race played in this case, it was virtually ignored in the public dis­
course. Penn State's internal investigators' short shrift to the race claims may offer a 
partial explanation. However, the fact that the omission of race is consistent with the 
pattern of single axis, reductionist analysis applied in other stories involving race, 
sexual orientation, and women's basketball makes it worthy of further analysis. It is 
a trend that may reflect the perception that sport-in particular basketball, due to its 
dominance by Black players-is a model of racial harmony, the perception that 
"good people" are not racist, and the perception that even talking about race is racist 
in this colorblind society. We have also suggested that the omission of race from the 
discourse about Harris's case derives in part from the role that single-axis antidis- f 
crimination law plays in the framing of discrimination cases and discrimination gen­
erally in the context of women's sport. We hope that this analysis contributes to a 
greater understanding of the ways in which both cultural and legal structures oper­
ate to erase the relevance of race in the context of women's sport. 
Notes 
I. National Center for Lesbian Rights (NCLR) also filed suit with the agency that enforces state 
antidiscrimination laws. the Pennsylvania Commission on Human Rights. This suit remained pending 
until Harris withdrew it as a condition of the settlement. 
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2. Not coincidentally, Rosenberg was reprimanded and temporarily suspended in 2001 after he 
remarked on the air that Venus and Serena Williams would be more likely to pose in National Geographic 
Ihan Playboy. 
3. One possible explanation we have heard for why Rosenberg chose to compare Rutgers to the 
Kaptors in particular is because they too wear red uniforms. 
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